We identify an ambiguity premium for US stocks from increases in the option-implied concavity of preferences immediately before scheduled macroeconomic announcements. Our methodology relies on Skiadas'(2013) critique of smooth ambiguity aversion models, which shows that ambiguity aversion has a negligible e¤ect on small risks, de…ned as risks that are proportional to the holding period. We show that the same critique implies that the e¤ect of smooth ambiguity aversion on large risks, such as macroeconomic announcements, should be of …rst-order importance. We test for the di¤erence in the e¤ect of ambiguity aversion on the two types of risk by studying the implied concavity of preferences for a representative agent, and con…rm that such concavity indeed increases signi…cantly ahead of announcements. Except for smooth ambiguity aversion, no other representative agent model predicts such an increase. JEL Classi…cation: G12
I. Introduction
Robustness to uncertainty (Knight 1921) , as opposed to risk, has been a central theme of much research in economics and other …elds. Ambiguity aversion can rationalize experimental evidence that is not consistent with expected utility theory. In experiments, agents reveal a strong preference for lotteries with a known distribution of payo¤s over those with the same mean payo¤ but an unknown distribution (Ellsberg 1961) . Moreover, ambiguity aversion has the potential to explain a number of asset-pricing puzzles. 1 One criticism of this research is that when risks are small, in the sense that they can be substantially reduced by updating and acting more frequently, ambiguity aversion may not be important (Skiadas 2013) . A second criticism is that direct evidence showing that uncertainty matters to agents in the …eld, for example by a¤ecting securities prices, is not as strong as the evidence from experiments. In this paper we argue that the …rst criticism o¤ers an opportunity to address the second by focusing on di¤erences in economic variables between small and large risks.
The intuition behind our argument is straightforward. Consider the following generic problem in economics: an agent tries to choose an action to maximize the expected value of an objective function f ( e Y ; ; e ) over some uncertain outcome e Y dependent on and with a probability distribution that in turn depends upon an uncertain parameter e with expectation . Assuming the problem can be well approximated by a second order Taylor expansion, the agent's value function is then
In a dynamic setting, an agent can sometimes adjust the action periodically so that the risk borne in the time interval between each adjustment is proportional to the length of the time interval. In such cases, we show in the next section that the agent's uncertainty 1 For example, Collard, Sheppard, Mukerji, and Tallon (2011) argue that smooth ambiguity aversion, which we describe below, can rationalize the otherwise puzzlingly high risk aversion required to explain the equity premium puzzle. Mankiw, in his discussion of Parker (2001) implicitly argues that some form of ambiguity aversion can rationalize the puzzlingly low rates of equity participation in the USA (Parker 2001, p. 335) . It is likely that other puzzles, such as the home bias puzzle of French and Poterba (1991) can also be attributed, at least to a certain extent, to aversion to uncertainty in the presence of learning.
V ar[ e ] is proportional to the square of the time interval, and therefore, for su¢ ciently small time intervals, irrelevant to the agent's welfare (unless V 00 is in…nite, in which case the agent is in…nitely averse to uncertainty). Our argument here is essentially the same as the one in Skiadas (2013) , who …rst pointed this out.
However, in other cases, adjusting the action, no matter how frequently, will not materially reduce the risk borne in a given time interval by the agent, and then V ar[ e ] is also proportional to the length of the time interval, and the e¤ect of uncertainty on welfare will be …rst-order even for …nite values of V 00 . These cases involve events that the agent knows will occur at particular times (pre-scheduled events). Such events are di¤erent from standard Poisson jumps or di¤usions (or their discrete-time analogs), and are unique to the social sciences, as, in order to matter, they require forward-looking agents.
An implication of this argument is that an impending pre-scheduled event will increase the concavity of an agent's preferences across possible outcomes if and only if their aversion to uncertainty, which is proportional to the negative of V 00 , is positive. Provided we can estimate the degree of concavity of an agent's preferences over payo¤s in di¤erent states, this insight provides us with a test for the existence of uncertainty or ambiguity aversion. Wilson (2013, 2014) show that equity and bond risk premia around important scheduled macroeconomic announcements are very high compared to other 'normal' times.
Sharpe ratios are also much higher, often ten to twenty times greater than in normal periods.
This …nding on its own, however, is not su¢ cient to show the existence of ambiguity aversion.
For that, we further need to show that the concavity of preferences of a representative investor increases ahead of scheduled announcements. This approach represents a particularly sharp test of smooth ambiguity aversion because no other representative agent model predicts such an increase in concavity.
We use S&P 500 index option prices from 1996 to 2013 to infer the concavity of a representative agent's preferences. 2 We plot the resulting implied concavities in Figure 1 , and do so separately for days immediately before scheduled macroeconomic announcements (blue line) and for 'regular' non-announcement days (black line). Each dot in the …gure is a local estimate of concavity, with 95% con…dence intervals shown as dotted lines of the same color.
The main result is that there is a clear increase in implied concavity ahead of announcements over nearly the entire range of states, consistent with ambiguity aversion and inconsistent with ambiguity neutrality. The di¤erence represents a lower bound on ambiguity aversion, since if non-announcement day risks are not all small (perhaps because investors cannot trade as rapidly as they would like), ambiguity aversion will then matter on non-announcement days as well.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.]
Estimating one global measure of concavity, rather than many local ones, requires making further assumptions about the form of expected utility under the null of zero ambiguity aversion.
Assuming for example CRRA utility, these option prices imply an increase in relative risk aversion from 8.4 to between 10.2 and 11.6 (depending on the type of announcement) ahead of scheduled announcements. A t-test for the di¤erence in these two estimates has a p-value of at most 0.3%. In sum, these results strongly reject the null of expected utility maximization over a known distribution of stock market returns, suggesting ambiguity aversion plays an important role in determining risk premia.
A number of studies attempt to identify ambiguity aversion at work in the …eld of asset pricing. These broadly fall into two categories. First, some studies identify the dispersion in a set of beliefs (most frequently professional analysts'forecasts) as a proxy for uncertainty or ambiguity about the true distribution of returns (see, e.g., Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens 2009; Drechsler 2013; Shi 2013; Ulrich 2013; and Antoniou, Harris, and Zhang 2014) . We refer to these studies as the dispersed predictions set of studies. Second, other studies estimate a structural model of ambiguity aversion on a set of asset pricing moments (see, e.g., Ju and Miao 2012; Jeong, Kim, and Park 2014; Thimme and Völkert 2014; and Gallant, Jahan-Parva, and Liu 2014) . We refer to these studies as structural models studies. 3 Dispersed predictions are neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient indicator of aggregate uncertainty about the true distribution of asset returns. Ambiguity-averse agents with the same preferences and prior beliefs who receive the same information should reach the same condi-tional beliefs about the world, even though they are ambiguity averse and there exists genuine uncertainty about the true distribution. Therefore, dispersion in beliefs is not necessary for ambiguity aversion. Non-ambiguity-averse agents who receive di¤erent information can reach di¤erent beliefs, and their predictions and actions need not fully reveal these beliefs, as shown in classic studies of noisy rational expectations models such as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) or Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) . If two expected-utility-maximizing agents receive di¤erent private signals, then they cannot necessarily infer the other's private signal from his action, and so dispersion in beliefs can persist even though no one is ambiguity-averse. Thus, heterogenous forecasts or actions cannot readily proxy for uncertainty, and are not su¢ cient for ambiguity aversion.
Structural models proceed by …tting an assumed model of decision-making to the data. In the case of ambiguity aversion, they fall into two groups: models which assume Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) 'maxmin'preferences, and those which assume smooth ambiguity aversion (of which Gilboa-Schmeidler preferences are an extreme special case). The results of models which assume Gilboa-Schmeidler preferences are clearly sensitive to the minimum (worst-case) distribution allowed in the support of prior distributions. Indeed, smooth ambiguity aversion models were developed to address the obvious weaknesses in the maxmin model, which is unable to separate beliefs (priors over distributions) from preferences (aversion to ambiguity). (See Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji 2005) . Models which allow smooth ambiguity aversion are more robust, but also are vulnerable to the critique in Skiadas (2013) , who shows that, given high-enough frequency trading, ambiguity aversion cannot a¤ect risk premia for small risks, except in the extreme special case of maxmin preferences.
In the rest of the paper, we present our arguments and …ndings in detail. Section II outlines the formal arguments; Section III explains our empirical methodology; Section IV gives our results; and Section V concludes.
II. Smooth ambiguity aversion and asset prices
Until recently, the only formal model of ambiguity aversion in decision theory was that of Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) 'maxmin'preferences, in which agents maximize expected utility over the most pessimistic possible prior distribution of returns. 4 Gilboa-Schmeidler preferences allow agents to assume the worst, which in principle can be very bad indeed, making participation, as opposed to non-participation, in risky assets such as equities hard to explain. Furthermore, such preferences are technically di¢ cult to work with, as well as being extremely, and probably excessively, sensitive to beliefs about unlikely states of the world. Finally, such preferences do not allow the separation of the degree of ambiguity (uncertainty) from the degree of aversion to ambiguity, and so cannot address comparative statics issues such as: how will decisions change as agents'aversion to ambiguity changes, holding the degree of uncertainty …xed? Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) (KMM) propose a model of preferences satisfying 'smooth'ambiguity aversion. Given a prior distribution over future states of the world s,
(or a continuous-state analog f (s)) and given prior probabilities fq g n =1 (or a continuous analog) that each of distributions p sj is the true distribution, agents try to maximize expected utility E [e u] while accounting for uncertainty about the true distribution (Knight 1921) . If the agent is ambiguity averse, he puts a lower weight on distributions that imply higher expected utility. Given a positive, increasing, concave, and di¤erentiable function (x), the agent tries to maximize
subject to the usual constraints. A linear (:) implies that agents are standard expected utility maximizers, using the compound distribution n =1 q p sj = E[p sj ] = p s . Broadly speaking, as the relative curvature of (:) increases, the preferences approach maxmin. 5
In a recent critique of smooth ambiguity aversion preferences, Skiadas (2013) points out that for 'small risks', i.e. risks from holding securities that are proportional to the holding period, the e¤ect of smooth ambiguity aversion on risk premia is negligible. Essentially, his argument is that while risks (as opposed to uncertainty) associated with holding securities are …rst-order (that is, proportional to the time interval or holding period), uncertainty about the expected returns and the magnitudes of these risks are second-order (proportional to the square of the time interval), and therefore have negligible impact on investors who can rebalance su¢ ciently frequently, except in the extreme case of in…nite ambiguity aversion (maxmin or Gilboa-Schmeidler ambiguity aversion).
Skiadas'critique, however, seems to o¤er a test for the existence of smooth ambiguity premia in stock market risk premia. Some risks, such as those posed by scheduled announcements (market-relevant news announcements with known release dates), are not small in the sense de…ned by Skiadas. In the case of these risks, ambiguity aversion imposes …rst-order di¤erences in risk premia relative to expected utility. In consequence, the concavity of the preferences of a representative agent should appear to increase ahead of scheduled announcements that impact risk premia and to decrease afterwards.
We next present our argument formally. First, we show how the concavity of preferences can increase ahead of pre-scheduled announcements if and only if a representative investor is ambiguity averse and requires a premium for bearing uncertainty. Then we explain why it is important to distinguish between unexpected information ‡ows (small risks, in Skiadas'sense) and scheduled announcements, which are not small risks.
II.A. Smooth ambiguity aversion and the option-implied concavity of the utility function
Consider an agent with KMM preferences allocating wealth across future states s = 1:::S.
The agent allocates current wealth across a complete portfolio of Arrow-Debreu securities with prices s (state prices) and demands x s . The agent's problem is given by
s:t:
The …rst order condition for all states s is then
where is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. In equilibrium, markets clear and x s = W s .
Gollier (2011) gives the following expression for state prices s :
where
Because (:) is concave, distributions that imply higher expected utility (broadly speaking a lower p sj for bad states, higher for good states) receive a lower 0 (:) than more pessimistic distributions, and so receive a lower weight w .
Note that S s=1 b p s = 1. Under the null hypothesis of ambiguity neutrality, 0 equals a constant, and then
where p s is just the unconditional expectation over all priors of the state probability. In our empirical work, we equate this to the physical probability (or density in a continuous-state model). This is permissible under the null, where the agent acts as if he knows the true probability distribution of payo¤s. When (:) is strictly concave, distributions that imply higher expected utility than some 'middle'distribution (not de…ned strictly) will receive b p s < p s while those distributions which imply lower expected utility receive b p s > p s .
The ratio of risk-neutral and physical state probabilities is then
If the states are ordered from low to high W s , we can write the derivative of state prices with respect to wealth (this is just a change of index from s to W s with p s = p(W s ) etc.) as
and then a concavity index CI(s) can be computed as follows:
The …rst term is just relative risk aversion, while the second term depends on the distortion induced to state probabilities by ambiguity aversion (:). Skiadas'point implies that for small risks (risks that in the limit of continuous time are either Brownian motions or Poisson jumps) this term will be negligible. However, the same argument implies that for non-small risks (e.g., scheduled announcements of news that will a¤ect stock market wealth), the second term will be positive if and only if (:) is concave. Therefore, an increase in our concavity index ahead of an important scheduled announcement (and decrease thereafter) represents evidence for an ambiguity premium.
For discrete-state probabilities the derivative with respect to state is not well-de…ned. The solution is either to go to continuous-state probabilities or else to consider something which in the limit converges to this. Thus, we can think of this derivative as
or the equivalent left-hand side (LHS) derivative, and which is approximated by the ratio on the right-hand side (RHS) for small s.
The concavity index is then
But the weights w are independent of s so
When (:) is strictly concave, distributions that imply low expected utility have a high weight w and ps b ps < 1, while those that imply high expected utility have a low weight and ps b ps > 1, in consequence the summation term will be positive, and our concavity indicator will be higher than (s) because of an ambiguity premium.
Gollier (2011) points out that the prior distributions can be such as to have more ambiguity aversion behave in a perverse manner if the distributions are completely general. He provides fairly weak su¢ cient conditions under which this will not occur, which in our case are really conditions on the derivatives p 0 sj . Essentially, a su¢ cient condition under which greater ambiguity or ambiguity aversion will increase concavity are that 'worse'distributions, which imply lower expected utility, are …rst-or second-order stochastically dominated by 'better'distributions. In practical applications these conditions will almost always hold. For example, if we assume agents are uncertain about the mean return, and have a support of prior distributions of increasing mean, higher-mean distributions dominate lower-mean distributions in the required way. 6
6 See Gollier for details.
II.B. Large versus small risks
The whole argument thus far depends on the weighting function
where E [:] denotes the expectation of utility under the assumption that payo¤s are distributed according to the probabilities p sj and E[:] denotes the expectation over all distributions weighting each one by its prior probability q . Over su¢ ciently small time intervals t, absent a pre-scheduled announcement, the expected utility E [u(W )], as shown by Skiadas, is
proportional to t and therefore we can write
where b , and c are constants and A t2 t is an indicator variable that equals one if there is an important scheduled announcement at a date t in the time interval t and zero otherwise. For
When there is no pre-scheduled announcement, we have
Therefore
The trick here is to notice that the state probabilities p sj are themselves of the order t. 
For scheduled announcements, there is a 'minimum'time interval in which p sj is not of the same order as the time interval, and trading more frequently will not reduce the risk by any material amount (shown below). In that case, the term
and then the second term in the concavity index will be positive provided agents actually are ambiguity averse.
Since we observe the LHS, W s and p s , we can, for a speci…ed set of prior distributions
and a pre-speci…ed functional form for (:), determine how large the ambiguity pre-
has to be to explain our results.
II.B.1. Announcement versus non-announcement periods
We next justify the claim that important scheduled announcements do not constitute a small risk. We give a simple example, which amply illustrates the general principle that announcements represent non-small risks.
Non-announcement periods
Assume that for non-announcement periods there is a single risky asset with initial continuous payo¤ X t whose future payo¤ is given by
where e " N (0; 1):
The variance 2 " is assumed to be common knowledge, while prior beliefs about mean log growth in the payo¤ are uncertain, with mean t and normally distributed around this mean.
Given a prior belief e ,
and
Thus, for a given prior, risk (i.e., the variance of return) is …rst order, as assumed. But,
while accounting for the uncertainty about the mean gives the overall mean square error:
Therefore, the uncertainty about the mean adds a term to the mean square error of order t 2 as claimed. We can then write:
We can use an exactly analogous argument to show that any additional uncertainty about the variance 2 " is also o( t). 
Announcement periods
Around announcements, de…ne an interval of a …xed length [t 1 ; t 2 ] which contains an announcement 'date'(an exact time) t A . The date t A is assumed to be common knowledge to all relevant participants. Suppose announcement news about log growth in a random payo¤ is drawn from the same distribution (i.e. there is a jump with a deterministic arrival time which is drawn from the uncertain distribution)
where k is an arbitrary constant used to scale the expected magnitude of the jump relative to the interval t = t 2 t 1 = 1. That is, given volatility of " of say daily payo¤ growth in a non-announcement period, the jump moves the payo¤ by an average of k e with a variance of k 2 X;A . This allows the Sharpe ratio of the jump to vary relative to the Sharpe ratio of non-announcement periods. Now further suppose the interval t 2 t 1 is such that relative to this interval, k = 1, without loss of generality.
Consider a trader who divides the interval into three equal sized intervals, so that t = (t 2 t 1 )=3 = 1=3 and rebalances his portfolio three times, instead of just once, before t 2 . Again, without loss of generality let t A be in the middle of these three periods,
There is then no announcement risk in the …rst and third periods, so variance of payo¤ growth is 2 " =3 and expected payo¤ growth is e =3. In the middle period, however, the variance of payo¤ growth is a¤ected by the presence of the announcement, and so is equal to ( 2 " =3) + 2 X;A , while expected growth is (4=3) e .
If he instead divides the interval into m subintervals, each subinterval that does not contain the announcement has the distribution of log change in payo¤ N ( e =m; 2 " =m). The subinterval containing the announcement, however, is drawn from the distribution N (((m + 1)=m) e ; ( 2 " =m) + 2 X;A ).
In one of these subintervals not containing the announcement, the expected squared error of the unconditional forecast of payo¤ growth (which accounts for uncertainty about the mean)
is then
while in the interval containing the announcement, the mean squared error is
(Here the variable e A t A is the pure e¤ect of the announcement on the payo¤.)
Thus, for small enough subintervals around the announcement, the uncertainty about the mean e will be the same order as the variance of log price growth. For investors who can rebalance their portfolios su¢ ciently often, non-announcement uncertainty is second order relative to risk, whereas uncertainty about the outcome of a scheduled announcement is …rst-order.
It is not necessary to observe variables over these very small subintervals, however. 
This di¤erence is independent of a, the size of the ball relative to the size of the subinterval containing the announcement. Therefore, even if the jump is fully contained by, for example, a 1-minute interval, the di¤erence in the importance of uncertainty for daily payo¤ growth will be …rst order for days containing announcements versus other days.
Letting m become large, the term 2 , which measures uncertainty about the mean expected payo¤ growth, only appears in the expression for concavity for pre-announcement periods, and is o( t) for post-or non-announcement periods. Thus, concavity should be higher ahead of important scheduled announcements than immediately after or than in normal (i.e. nonannouncement) periods.
III. Empirical procedure and results

III.A. Data
Our study uses S&P 500 Equity Index options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The S&P 500 is one of the most actively-traded indexes in the world and represents a good proxy for the aggregate US stock market. S&P 500 Index options are European, cashsettled options and are available for a wide array of expiration dates and a dense grid of strike prices.
S&P 500 Index options have three maturity types. The …rst and predominant type has monthly maturity intervals. The expiration date is always set on the Saturday after the third Our sample covers the period starting in January 1996 and ending in August 2013, over which we collect 4,077,580 bid and ask prices. The average daily trading volume during this time period was about 300,000 contracts, and the most active contracts are typically those with shortest maturities. We obtain option prices, required data on the underlying, dividend yields, and risk-free rates for di¤erent maturities from Optionmetrics.
We exclude from our analysis options that have a bid price below $0.5, as these usually have prohibitively high spreads, low volume, and low informational value. We also exclude sets for a given day that contain fewer than eight available strike values for puts and calls, as well as deep-in-the-money options, since their trading volumes are very low. We replace the removed data points for deep in-the-money put options with the corresponding values for out-of-the-money calls using put-call parity, and vice versa for deep in-the-money calls. We further exclude options where implied volatility cannot be calculated, which typically happens because of violations of no-arbitrage conditions. Option contracts with maturities of fewer than eight days often show erratic behavior and consequently we also omit these contracts. Finally, due to data availability reasons, we remove options with maturities above three years. Since option trades do not occur continuously for all maturities and strikes and to ensure that prices have information content, on a given day we study only options that have a positive trading volume.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.] Figure 2 plots the average number of contracts we include in our sample for a given maturity.
Clearly the majority of available data are concentrated in maturities of up to three months.
Therefore, we focus our analysis on that maturity interval.
III.B. Methodology
A set of options with a common expiration date represents a snapshot of aggregated market beliefs, which allows us to extract the risk neutral density (RND) for that maturity. We can then apply the idea in Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000) to infer the concavity of preferences (relative risk aversion, under the null of zero ambiguity aversion) from RNDs (together with the physical probability density). The approach we adopt follows the methodology in Figlewski (2008) and also incorporates ideas by Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) , Banz and Miller (1978), Shimko (1993) , and Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) .
III.B.1. Interpolation and smoothing
Before we can extract an RND that is suitable for further analysis, we clean the data to remove possible inconsistencies and eliminate extreme outliers with very low volume and high spreads, so as to prevent our estimated RNDs from displaying theoretically impossible features such as negative density values. Many direct smoothing approaches lead to erratic ‡uctuations near the at-the-money strikes. To address this issue, Shimko (1993) proposes an algorithm that converts option prices into implied volatilities based on the Black-Scholes model. The implied volatilities are then smoothed and interpolated, before prices for a dense set of equally-spaced strike prices are re-converted back to prices as a basis for the extraction of the RNDs. Shimko (1993) stresses that the transformation does not assume the correctness of the Black-Scholes model, but merely uses the Black-Scholes formula as an algorithm that allows researchers to smooth and interpolate the given option set in a space that, though being theoretically inconsistent, preserves the volatility structure and information content comparably well. In this study, we try to use as little smoothing and adjustment of the data as possible. However, in order to aggregate the data by degrees of moneyness, we need comparable data points that do not necessarily correspond to available strike levels and thus require the use of interpolation.
We evaluated several smoothing methods. Higher order polynomials already provide a high degree of ‡exibility and are able to …t a large part of the volatility surface. However splines, as for example those used by Figlewski (2008) , allow an even more accurate replication of the features of the curves. Cubic and fourth order splines run mandatory through all k data points and …t the resulting curve by k 1 aggregated polynomials of third (or fourth) order. Apart from the function value itself, all derivatives up to the second (third) derivative are aligned at the transition points between the polynomials. The 6 th order polynomial imposes its curvature on the data points and leads partly to comparably large deviations. The cubic spline on the other hand has to run through all data points and also incorporates outliers that should be removed in the …t. In order to address these weaknesses, we also test smoothing splines, which allow the curve to not exactly go through all data points. The amount of acceptable deviation is de…ned by a smoothness parameter as proposed by Bliss (2002) . Nevertheless, outliers in one area can still negatively a¤ect the whole …tted curve.
In this paper, we thus employ B-splines to reduce drastic outliers. B-splines are a generalization of Bezier curves and are closely related to smoothing splines. They also do not require that the curve runs through all data points. A set of knot points is chosen and these act as transition points between areas in which the curve has di¤erent characteristics. In between those knot points, a polynomial function is …tted with a least square algorithm. To minimize the impact on the information content, we calibrate the process to employ a dense set of knots and tolerate only small deviations from the actual data points. We employ this smoothing technique at the level of the extraction of the risk neutral distribution and smooth the curve before it is transformed into the risk-neutral probability density (RND). As this method already enables us to extract suitable RND estimates, we refrain from using smoothing in volatility space in our results. We only use the method suggested by Shimko as a comparison method. Figure 3 provides an illustration of the impact of the smoothing method we employ.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.] III.B.2. Risk-neutral probability density function extraction
Figlewski (2008), following Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) , exploits the fact that the RND function (x) allows us, assuming risk neutrality, to express the value of a security as the value of its expected payo¤ at maturity T . For a call option, this is the probability-weighted di¤erence between the stock price S T and the strike K at maturity T :
C represents the call price, P the put price, S t the price of the underlying asset at time t, K the strike price, r the risk-free rate, and T the maturity. Correspondingly, we can write the price of a put option as:
As shown in Figlewski (2008) , it is possible to extract (x) and (x) (the risk neutral distribution function (x) = R x 1 (z)dz) from the partial derivatives of option prices with respect
Solving for (K) and taking the second derivative yields:
For put options, the analogous expressions are given by:
We show the typical shape of the risk neutral distribution function (x) and the RND function (x) in Figures 4 and 5. The risk neutral distribution function runs S-shaped from 0 to 1. It resembles a distorted cumulative normal distribution function. The RND (see Figure   5 ) resembles a normal distribution. It is however typically leptokurtic and skewed.
[FIGURES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE.]
Given a set of options with a common maturity spanning all realistic strike prices K, it is possible to estimate the RND and risk-neutral distribution function using numerical derivatives (see Equations 33a and b). 7 The denser the grid of strike prices that is provided by the option set and the smaller the bid/ask-spreads, the more accurate the extracted functions.
III.B.3. Option-implied concavity of preferences
Given our estimates of the RND and physical densities p(S T ), and letting (S T ) = (S T )=p(S T ), our concavity index can be estimated using equation (9) where
IV. Results: Changes in implied concavity for large risks Savor and Wilson (2013) show that asset prices behave di¤erently on days of pre-scheduled macroeconomic announcements about in ‡ation, unemployment, and interest rates. In this section, we estimate the e¤ect of such announcements on the physical probability densities of equity indices and on the option-implied risk-neutral probability densities. We then show that option-implied concavity on days with macroeconomic announcements is higher than concavity for regular non-announcement (non-a) days.
As in Savor and Wilson (2013) , we consider announcements on the Producers Price Index (PPI), unemployment (Emp), and Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) interest rate decisions. Our sample includes 761 announcements in the period starting in January 1996 and ending in August 2013. We use the S&P 500 equity index and its index options as a proxy for the US equity market.
IV.A. Physical probability density Figure 6 plots the physical probability density of S&P 500 returns, aggregated over the sample period from 1996 to 2013. We use daily returns and compare announcement days to 'regular' days without announcements. Daily returns on non-announcement days are clearly concentrated in a narrow area above at-the-money. Returns strongly deviating from this area are rare and the observed physical probability density falls away very quickly for rising or falling moneyness.
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE.]
The behavior of the physical density is di¤erent on days with announcements, with lower clustering around the center of the distribution and much higher mass on higher-return outcomes, as well as somewhat higher mass on lower-return outcomes. (In fact, although not shown here, the distribution of FOMC-day market returns …rst-order stochastically dominates that of non-announcement day returns). Results are similar for all a-days together.
IV.B. Implied risk-neutral probability density
Option markets o¤er insights into the aggregated beliefs of market participants. In particular, risk-neutral probability densities (RND) extracted from liquid option prices o¤er a sensitive instrument to visualize market expectations. Figure 7 shows the reaction of the market to an especially dramatic announcement. On September 29, 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives voted against the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, commonly referred to as a bailout of the …nancial system, putting the planned liquidity infusion in jeopardy, with a predictably negative e¤ect on the markets. On the next day, the Senate approved the bailout as an amendment to an already existing piece of legislation and, as a result, managed to calm the markets. Figure 7 presents the implied RND on the Friday preceding the House vote, on the day of the vote, and the day thereafter. On the day of the vote the RND drastically widened, illustrating the increased uncertainty. On the next day, after the bailout passed the Senate, the RND went back to its prior shape. Only a small residue of increased uncertainty is visible in the form of a decreased maximum and a wider distribution relative to September 29.
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE.]
Physical and implied probability distributions can di¤er considerably. Figure 8 compares the physical probability distribution to the average implied RND. The implied curves, aggregated from 1996 to 2013, are distinctly wider and show that the market incorporates a higher degree of uncertainty in its expectation than historically observed, which is the well-known variance risk premium.
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE.]
We now examine the e¤ect of announcement days on the implied RNDs. In Figure 9 , we show the average RND on non-announcement days, implied by options with maturities up to three months and an average maturity of about 44 days. We compare this RND to announcementday RNDs, separately for PPI, Employment, and FOMC, as well as the aggregate of all three.
Once more, we document an increase in the width of the curve and more uncertainty re ‡ected in the option market.
[FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE.] We conclude that there is signi…cant impact of announcements on the market. p-values for all three tests are quite low, and indicate that the RND on announcement days is distinctly di¤erent than on regular non-announcement days. In particular, announcements lead to a measurable reduction of the RND's maximum and to its widening.
IV.C. Implied concavity
In this section we investigate the e¤ect of announcement days on the implied concavity of preferences of a representative investor in the market. As described in Subsection II.A, we derive the concavity of preferences from the pricing kernel (W s ) = s =p s where s is the implied RND and p s is the physical probability density. We can then estimate the implied concavity as follows: Figure 10 shows the average pricing kernel based on the extracted RND and the observed physical density used in this study. It is U-shaped around a minimum around the at-themoney level. As discussed above, we transform the pricing kernel to obtain an estimate of the implied concavity. Note that the time horizon used for the estimation is based on options with a mean maturity of 44 days or about 6 weeks. Consequently a 1% variation in moneyness corresponds to a signi…cantly larger annualized price ‡uctuation.
[FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE.]
In order to show that market implied concavity di¤ers signi…cantly for days with and without announcements, we investigate each announcement type separately and compare the respective implied concavity to non-announcement days. We furthermore conduct t-tests, KolmogorovSmirnov tests, and Mann-Whitney tests to show that di¤erences are statistically signi…cant.
Figures 11 through 13 show the concavity index values for FOMC, PPI, and Employment announcement days, respectively. (Figure 1 , which we discussed above, plots the concavity index values for all three announcement types together.) We also always present the concavity estimate for non-announcement days (i.e., days other than PPI, Employment, or FOMC days).
[FIGURES 11-13 ABOUT HERE.]
As expected, we …nd a clearly visible increase in our concavity index ahead of scheduled announcements. On days of FOMC or PPI announcements, the concavity index (CI) increases on average by 17 %. The increase is 4-7% lower for Employment announcements. These increases are distinctly visible only on announcement days. On post-announcement days, the implied concavity reverts back to its normal levels.
The graphs depict average concavity values and are based on an average maturity of 44 days. We provide statistical analysis in Table 2 , where we aggregate concavity estimates over a prede…ned moneyness area, spanning the range from 0.98 to 1.02, to form one concavity value per day and maturity. We then compare the distributions of those aggregated concavity values on announcement days to the respective values of the distributions on non-announcement days.
We especially focus on the area around at-the-money, as it provides highest data quality and the largest amount of available data. options typically show a decrease rather than an increase in concavity).
In summary, with the exception of employment announcements, which we include for completeness, these results provide strong evidence for an increase in concavity around announcement days and therefore for the existence of a signi…cant ambiguity premium.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.]
V. Conclusion
In this paper we argue that a distinction between large risks (risks that cannot be materially reduced by trading more frequently) and small risks (risks that can be so reduced) allows us to identify evidence for smooth ambiguity aversion in stock market data. Our argument proceeds by taking Skiadas'(2013) critique of smooth ambiguity aversion seriously, and showing when this critique does not apply. In particular, we show that only in the presence of ambiguity aversion should agents' preferences become more concave ahead of pre-scheduled macroeconomic
announcements.
We then demonstrate how to estimate this concavity for a representative agent by combining the idea in Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000) with more recently developed techniques for extracting RNDs. Our resulting empirical …ndings provide strong evidence for an increase in estimated concavity ahead of macroeconomic announcements and thus for the existence of an ambiguity risk premium.
Of course, there are alternative hypotheses that can explain our results. Perhaps the most obvious one is that a representative agent simply becomes more risk-averse ahead of announcements. On its face, this idea seems very ad hoc, but if heterogenous agents reallocate risks ahead of announcements, then it is conceivable that the risk aversion of the marginal holder of the market might be higher. Such a model would be much more complicated than our simple, tractable model of a representative agent with smooth ambiguity aversion, and to our knowledge no such model has ever been developed.
A second possibility is that our estimates of physical probability are subject to small sample bias. However, this is more likely to be a problem in the tails of the distribution, as opposed to the center, and our results actually are the strongest for the center of the distribution. 
